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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A NEW APPROACH TO JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS?
Plaintiff, a Washington corporation,1 is a general insurance broker
procuring "hard-to-get" insurance exclusively for other brokers. De-
fendant, a California corporation, telephoned plaintiff requesting it to
obtain insurance for Cisco Aircraft, Inc., a customer negotiating a
crop and forest dusting contract. Plaintiff obtained high-risk, high-
premium coverage through its London broker and wired defendant
a binder. Cisco defaulted and coverage was cancelled. Plaintiff paid
its London broker the earned premiums and sought recovery from
defendant.
Defendant was served pursuant to the Washington long arm statute.2
I Griffiths & Sprague were brokering as the Farwest General Agency.
'WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (1959) provides in part:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person
or through an agent does any of the acts in this section enumerated, thereby sub-
mits said person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the juris-
diction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the
doing of any of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this state;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any property whether real or personal
situated in this state;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at
the time of contracting.
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state, as provided in this section, may be made by personally
serving the defendant outside this state, as provided in RCW 4.28.180, with the
same force and effect as though personally served within this state.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted
against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon
this section.
By 1965, twenty-nine states, including Washington, had enacted expanded juris-
dictional statutes. For a recent compilation see 51 VA. L. REv. 719 n.4 (1965).
Some statutes have a longer reach than the Washington law. For instance, VA.
CoDE ANN. § 8-81.2 (Supp. 1966) enumerates acts that will subject a non-resident to
forum jurisdiction:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly
or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's
(1) Transacting any business in this State;
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this State;
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this State;
(4) Causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission outside this
State if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered, in this State;
(5) Causing tortious injury in this State to any person by breach of warranty
expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this State when he
might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by
the goods in this State, provided that he also regularly does or solicits business,
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial rev-
enue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this State;
(6) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this State; or
19681
VASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Defendant unsuccessfully challenged the jurisdiction of the court.'
Plaintiff received a $41,275.15 judgment because the jury found that
defendant had agreed to pay the premiums.4 On appeal, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court affirmed. Held: Defendant "overtly performed acts
making it a party to and participant in a business transaction in Wash-
ington .. ," and was therefore subject to the jurisdiction of Washington
courts under the long arm statute as to that particular transaction.
Griffiths & Sprague Stevedoring Co. v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc.,
71 Wash. Dec. 2d 667, 430 P.2d 600 (1967).
In Griffiths the court admitted the necessity of a "connecting tie or
link between a non-resident and the forum state" before the forum
state could assert jurisdiction under the long arm statute.' The court
felt that the increasing integration of commerce, finance, manufactur-
ing and agriculture virtually guaranteed existence of the connecting
link. Three recent Washington cases were cited to demonstrate the
ease with which the connection was found and to support a finding
of jurisdiction in the principal case.'
The court's decision in Griffiths examined "notions of fair play and
substantial justice,"8 and followed a long line of Washington juris-
diction cases that focused on this due process issue rather than on
the meaning of the statutory phrase "transaction of any business. '
(7) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State
at the time of contracting.
The Arizona legislature avoided the enumerated acts approach with a broadly
phrased rule. ARIz. RULES OF CiV. PROC. 4(e)(2) provides in part:
When the defendant ... is a person... which has caused an event to occur in this
state out of which the claim which is the subject of the complaint arose, service
may be made as herein provided, and when so made shall be of the same effect
as personal service within the state.
'Defendant, Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., appeared specially to challenge the juris-
diction of the court. The challenge denied, defendant preserved the objection to
jurisdiction in the answer and renewed it at the conclusion of plaintiff's case.
'Griffiths & Sprague Stevedoring Co. v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 71 Wash.
Dec. 2d 667, 668-69, 430 P.2d 600, 601 (1967). The jury, through a special verdict,
answered "yes" to the interrogatory: "Did the defendants agree that premiums due
on the policies delivered to them for use of Cisco Aircraft, Inc. were to be charged
to them ?" This verdict clearly settled the issue of defendant's liability. Conse-
quently, defendant's strongest argument for reversal revolved around the jurisdiction
question.
Id. at 673, 430 P.2d at 604.0 Id. at 671, 430 P.2d at 603.
Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wn. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963); Quigley v. Spano Crane
Sales & Serv., Inc., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 193, 422 P.2d 512 (1967); Golden Gate Hop
Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wn. 2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965).
'71 Wash. Dec. 2d at 673, 430 P.2d at 604.
'Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245
(1963); Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wn. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963); Golden Gate Hop
Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wn. 2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965); Quigley
v. Spano Crane Sales & Serv., Inc., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 193, 422 P.2d 512 (1967);
Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 845, 425 P.2d 647 (1967); Calla-
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But Griffiths' approach to long arm jurisdiction was unique in one
respect. The court restricted its due process analysis to a single
factor-defendant's overt self-involvement in a Washington contract.
Other Washington decisions resolved the due process issue only after
consideration of a multiplicity of factors such as the relative con-
venience of the parties,"0 defendant's compliance with state admin-
istrative regulations, 1 the extent of defendant's past activity in the
forum,'2 and the state's interest in the litigation.'
With the possible exception of Griffiths, the Washington court has
never compared the relative merits of the factors comprising due
process analysis.'4 Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 5
the initial case construing RCW 4.28.185, laid the groundwork for
this undifferentiated analysis. After reviewing International Shoe Co.
v. Washington0 and the decisions it spawned, 17 the Tyee court con-
cluded that "there are three basic factors which must coincide" to
support jurisdiction. First, there must be a purposeful act. Second,
the cause of action must arise from that act. And third, notions of
due process must be observed-
ban v. Keystone Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 814, 435 P.2d 626 (1967).
The statutory language is found in WASH. REv. CODE § 4.28.185 (1) (a) (1959). See
note 2, supra.
"o Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 106, 117, 381 P.2d
245, 252 (1963) ; Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wn. 2d 987, 997-98, 385 P.2d 305, 311-12 (1963) ;
Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wn. 2d 469, 472, 403 P.2d
351, 354 (1965); Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 814,
829, 435 P.2d 626, 636 (1967).
' Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 814, 829, 435 P.2d
626, 636 (1967).
'- Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 106, 116-17, 381 P.2d
245, 252 (1963); Quigley v. Spano Crane Sales & Serv., Inc., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 193,
198, 422 P.2d 512, 515 (1967); Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72 Wash.
Dec. 2d 814, 828-29, 435 P.2d 626, 636 (1967).
' Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wn. 2d 987, 998, 385 P.2d 305, 311 (1963) Callahan v. Key-
stone Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 814, 828, 435 P.2d 626, 635-36 (1967).
4 The failure to compare the relative merits of the factors comprising due pro-
cess analysis is a shortcoming evident in the decisions of many courts other than
that of Washington. See, e.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th
Cir. 1965); Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955); S.
Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 348 U.S. 983 (1955).
For excellent criticism of courts' tendency to ignore the comparative value of due
process factors, see Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction
of State Courts, 66 MicH. L. Rnv. 227 (1967); Note, In Personan Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations: An Interest-Balancing Test, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 33 (1967).
"' 62 Wn. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963).
10326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
For a comprehensive analysis of International Shoe and subsequent cases, see
Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAiv. L. Rxv. 909 (1960).
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consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity
in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits
and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective par-
ties, and the basic equities of the situation.' s
The Tyee opinion implies that the court must always consider
every factor relevant to the jurisdictional issue. 9 Thus, the Tyee
court denied jurisdiction after it listed nine "pertinent facts" and
"balanced" seven resolving factors. 0
The outcome of Tyee was probably in accord with "the traditional
notions ' 2 ' but, since the court failed to discuss the comparative im-
'
8 Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 106, 116, 381 P.2d
245, 251 (1963).
19 The Tyee court reached this often quoted conclusion after studying all the due
process factors discussed by the United States Supreme Court. The court's footnotes
to these federal cases indicated that its conclusion was a single distillation and
combination of all elements of jurisdictional due process previously stressed by the
Supreme Court.
'Tvee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 62 Wn. 2d at 116-17, 381 P.2d
at 252 (1963):
A review of the affidavits ... reveals the following pertinent facts: (1) Belyea's
principal place of business is in New Jersey, and it has never solicited, quali-
flied or registered to do, or previously done, any business in the state of Wash-
ington, or kept or maintained any office, personnel, advertising, telephone list,
goods or property here; (2) Dulien solicited Belyea to buy or obtain a buyer for
Dulien's electrical generators located in the state of Washington; (3) Negotia-
tions between Dulien and Belyea, leading to the ultimate sale of the generators,
were conducted by telephone, correspondence, and inspection trips by an agent or
agents of Belyea; (4) Negotiations between Belyea and National Carbon Com-
pany, the ultimate purchaser, were conducted out of state; (5) Under the terms
of sale negotiated by Belyea, Dulien was required to dismantle and load the
generators for shipment, subject to direction and supervision by an electrical
engineer designated by National Carbon Company; (6) Dulien, of its own voli-
tion, selected and contracted with Tyee to perform the dismantling and loading
operation for a stipulated price; (7) Tyee's claim for added labor costs revolves
around whether it ,\as entitled, under the terms of its contract with Dulien, to
'shoot" or "gad" out certain concrete beams in the dismantling operation; (8)
An agent or agents of Belyea's entered the state of Washington during dis-
mantling and loading operations, and participated in discussions regarding such
operations; and (9) Belyea's services in connection with the sale of the gener-
ators were essentially those of a broker.
In resolving the problem presented, we have considered and balanced the fol-
lowing: (a) Belyea's principal place of business is in New Jersey; (b) the
generator transaction represented an isolated business excursion into this state
by Belyea; (c) Belvea's participation in the transaction was solicited by Du-
lien; (d) the transaction involved no systematic or continuing service by Bel-
yea; (e) the presence of any agents of Belyea in this state was incidental,
rather than essential, to the transaction; (f) the primary action rests upon the
Dulien-Tyee contract; and (g) the probable inconvenience and expense incident
to Belyea's defense in this state.
Though the court states that it "balanced" the seven factors, it is clear that the fac-
tors are not balanced; rather, all seven factors mitigate against jurisdiction. This
aspect of the decision appears conclusory.
" Since "the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" are exceed-
ingly vague (see p. 837 infra and note 23 infra) and since the facts of the case are not
exceptionally persuasive in either direction, the Tyee court could have asserted
[ VOL. 43 : 821
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portance of specific facts, its reasoning was unenlightening.22 This
shortcoming is not inherent in due process analysis. Admittedly, juris-
dictional due process is a vague notion and the natural tendency is
for a court to take every fact into consideration and draw a conclusion
according to the equally vague notion of "natural justice."2 But the
United States Supreme Court has discussed factors which comprise
justice in the context of jurisdictional controversies, and has been able
to distinguish the relative merits of the various factors.24
The Griffiths court seems to depart from Washington's usual undif-
ferentiated due process analysis. The court based its decision on a sin-
gle factor--defendant's act of seeking out plaintiff. Other factors,
particularly defendant's substantial past activity in the state,25 were ar-
jurisdiction as easily as denied it Because of changes in the court's perspective it
is possible that the Griffiths court would have decided the Tyee case differently
than did the court in 1963. See discussion of the past activity factor, pp. 840-42 infra.
'2Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 567-68. The author briefly discusses the Tyee case
and specifically refrains from approving since he is uncertain what the court held.
Another example of this amorphous reasoning is Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks
Mfg. Co., 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 814, 435 P.2d 626 (1967). In that case the Washington
court considered, at length, eight factors determinative of the due process issue. No
one factor was deemed more significant than another. Id. at 828-30, 435 P.2d at
635-36.
'Mr. Justice Black in his dissent in International Shoe criticises the Court
for- conditioning state jurisdiction upon "vague Constitutional criteria." He feels
that the Constitution, "without any 'ifs' or 'buts,'" leaves to each state the power to
open the doors of its courts for its citizens to sue corporations whose agents do
business in those states. The "due process" standard is particularly offensive, ac-
cording to Black, "[flor application of this natural law concept, whether under the
terms 'reasonableness,' 'justice,' or 'fair play,' makes judges the supreme arbiters of
the country's laws and practices." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, at 323-26 (dissent).
'International Shoe formulated a test of reasonableness and fairness based on an
analysis of "minimum contacts" but failed to explain which "contacts" were most
important. The only due process factor mentioned in the opinion was convenience
to the corporate defendant. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, however, have
attempted to recognize and balance underlying interests.
There have been two major interpretations of the minimum contacts test since
International Shoe. In both the Court demonstrated that it would not discuss every
relevant factor of due process; and, that it considered some factors more important
than others. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the
Court, in approving jurisdiction, made clear that the decisive factor was Califor-
nia's interest in providing governmental redress for its citizens when their insurers
refused to pay claims. Much less important was the factor of inconvenience to the
corporate defendant. "Modern transportation and communications" the Court stated,
"have made it less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a state where he
engages in economic activity." Id. at 223.
In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1957), the court again stressed one factor-
the absence of a purposeful act in the forum. In denying jurisdiction, the Court
carefully distinguished between choice-of-law issues and jurisdictional questions.
It minimized the facts that the forum was the domicile of many parties and was the
most convenient location for litigation.
' Defendant's past activity in the forum is revealed in the appellate briefs. De-
fendant conceded that for seven years prior to the suit it had maintained a reciprocal
agreement with plaintiff to handle and service customer accounts. On several occa-
sions, defendant's officers and agents entered the state for that purpose and from
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gued to the court" but ignored in the opinion. The court could have in-
tentionally ignored the past activity in order to highlight the singular
importance of the "overt" act."7 Or, the court could have felt that the
one reason mentioned was sufficient justification for the decision.2"
Exact determination of the rationale for the court's approach is
impossible; however, the court's reasoning may reveal a new view of
jurisdictional due process. One could conclude from Griffiths that
it is unnecessary for a court to discuss every factor relevant to a just
resolution of the issue. 29 The court may finally have recognized that
some factors are more important than others. If this is so the court
may, in some cases, still engage in "balancing" but may weigh factors
unequally. In other cases, like Griffiths, the court may completely
abandon the scales and rely on a single persuasive fact.3" While the
weight of the factors will vary with changing factual situations, Grif-
fiths may stand for the proposition that in cases where a foreign cor-
"time to time" plaintiff, for a commission, had procured insurance for customers of
the defendant. From 1958 through 1964, defendant's name was listed in the Seattle
telephone directory, though plaintiff had paid for the listing and the listed number
was answered on plaintiff's switchboard. Brief for Appellant at 3, 10-11, Griffiths
& Sprague Stevedoring Co. v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 71 Wash. Dec. 2d 667,
430 P.2d 600 (1967).
'Defendant's past activity in Washington was argued to the court at length by
both parties. See Brief for Respondent at 1-3, 11; Brief for Appellant at 3, 10-11,
Griffiths & Sprague Sevedoring Co. v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 71 Wash. Dec. 2d
667, 430 P.2d 600 (1967).
'Since the court does not say explicitly why it restricted its analysis to the one
factor, observers are unable to assess the degree to which the court was emphasizing
the purposeful act. Certainly, an outright comparison of the importance of the overt
act, defendant's past activity, and other factors would have been preferable.
'Defendant's purposeful act and substantial past activity, plus the convenience
of Washington as a location for the litigation demonstrate the fairness of asserting
Washington jurisdiction. Apparently, the court determined that lengthy analysis
was unnecessary.
' When all the due process factors point in one direction, either for or againstjurisdiction, there is no reason for the court to belabor the issue by casually men-
tioning every relevant factor. See, e.g., Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Products,
Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963); Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks Mfg. Co.,
72 Wash. Dec. 2d 814, 435 P.2d 626 (1967). In such cases, the court's opinion would
be more meaningful if one or two of the most important factors were highlighted.
'o Just as the Grifliths court emphasized the purposeful act, the Callahan court could
have emphasized the hazardous nature of defendant's product. Even if Keystone had
not overtly submitted to jurisdiction (in the Grifliths' schema) by selling $6,696.85
worth of fireworks to a Washington distributor, there would have been another and
equally compelling reason to assert jurisdiction. Defendant was trafficking in a very
hazardous commodity and its sale in Washington evoked strong governmental inter-
est. The Washington legislature had recognized the inherently dangerous character-
istics of fireworks and had enacted WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.77.380-525 (Supp. 1967) to
regulate their sale and distribution. Keystone sought and received a license to sell
fireworks from the Washington State Fire Marshal. Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks
Mfg. Co., 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 814, 435 P.2d 626 (1967). As in McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 325 U.S. 220 (1957), a single, even minor, isolated excursion into the
forum state submits defendant to jurisdiction where the item involved is regulated
by the forum.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
poration knowingly and purposefully establishes contact with the
forum it will be very difficult to deny jurisdiction."'
The purposeful act factor was first discussed by the United States
Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla 2 In Hanson, jurisdiction was
refused because of the absence of a purposeful act." Although the
Washington Supreme Court recognized the factor in Tyee, 4 it was the
Griffiths decision that suggested that a purposeful act would be the key
factor in the jurisdictional due process analysis of contract disputes.
' Griffiths & Sprague Stevedoring Co. v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 71 Wash.
Dec. 2d 667, 672-73, 430 P.2d 600, 604 (1967).
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
'Citing International Shoe, the Court said: "[I]t is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum State.... " The Court concluded:
"The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State." Id. at 253.
Mr. Justice Goldberg commented on the Hanson requirement (in denying an
application for a stay in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1, 4
(1965)) by referring to Currie, supra note 22, at 549, saying: "Currie has inter-
preted and generalized the Hanson test as a requirement 'that the defendant must
have taken voluntary action calculated to have an effect in the forum state."'
' Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 106, 115, 117, 381
P.2d 245, 251, 252 (1963). In Tyee the manner of reference implies that the purpose-
ful act is a statutory requirement. Indeed, Belyea's overt acts in the state are not
considered along with other factors of due process. Tyee's approach to the purpose-
fulness factor helps explain why the purposeful act was not emphasized in the early
cases.
While it is true that the purposeful act may be a statutory prerequisite it is also
clear that the purposeful act is a factor vital to due process analysis. In Hanson,
the factor is characterized as an element of due process analysis. 357 U.S. at 253.
In Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 814, 435 P.2d 626
(1967), the Washington court first refers to the purposeful act as a statutory require-
ment and then as a due process factor. Id. at 826, 829, 435 P.2d at 634, 636.
In applying the purposeful act factor the Washington court uses the term "pur-
poseful" in the context of an overt and voluntary contact with the forum. The court
has avoided spawning a new label that could be mechanistically applied. Since the
ultimate test is fairness, not "purposefulness," reference to "purposefulness" is merely
a way of characterising the contact.
There remains the danger, however, that some courts might resort to labeling. The
grafting of fictitious meanings on the label would be the next step. Unfortunately,
the history of state jurisdictional expansion is replete with such developments. For
instance, personal jurisdiction was once based on the common law doctrines of con-
sent and presence. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). However, the need
for expanded state court jurisdiction led to the notions of "fictitious presence" and
"implied consent-" See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579
(1914) (doing business in Kentucky was said to be presence within the state);
Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915) (a corporation failing to designate a
process agent required by law con~ents by implication to appointment of the Secre-
tary of State as its agent for suits arising in the forum); Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 353 (1927) (operation of an automobile on Massachusett's highways implied
consent to appointment of the Secretary of State as a process agent for causes of
action arising from any accident in the state).
A recent Massachusetts decision suggests that courts are already beginning to strain
the meaning of "purposefulness." Wolfman v. Modern Life Ins. Co.,--Mass.-,
225 N.E.2d 598, appeal dismissed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3203 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1967) (where
a New York insurer issued policy in New York and insured assigned replacement
policy to Massachusetts' resident, the insurer "purposefully" transacted business in
Massachusetts in servicing the policy).
1968 ]
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The purposeful act factor is most relevant in contract situations
because contracts are, by their nature, consensual.3 5 Obviously, a
manufacturer or insurance broker who participates in a business
transaction in a foreign jurisdiction is acting purposefully, and the
consequences of his acts are foreseeable. Since the out-of-state corpor-
ation enters the forum for its advantage, it seems "fair play" to re-
quire the non-resident to submit to forum justice in controversies
arising from its profit seeking. It would not be persuasive for a foreign
corporation which has knowingly made contact with the forum to
argue that it would be inconvenient to defend a suit in the forum
state."
A comparison of Tyee and Grifiths reveals the shift in emphasis
toward the purposeful act factor and suggests that the past activity
factor may have been misunderstood and overrated. In Tyee, the
'The purposeful act factor has only minor significance in tort cases. Since
torts or consequences of tortious conduct are, in essence, accidents it is much less
likely that purposefulness will be involved. It is at this point that a foreseeability
test assumes importance in jurisdictional analysis as well as tort analysis.
In products liability cases, the foreseeability of tortious consequences of products
distribution may reach such a stage that the consequences may be characterized as
purposeful. F$conomic integration has reached the point that any manufacturer who
introduces a product into the stream of commerce would find it difficult to deny
anticipation that it would arrive in a foreign jurisdiction. See Levin, The "Long
Arm" Statute and Products Liability, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 331 (1967).
In most tort cases past activity is a relevant factor for balancing. Specifically, it
is useful to determine whether a manufacturer or retailer intends his products to
find their way into another jurisdiction. Thus, in a recent Washington case, the
court denied jurisdiction over an Oregon retailer who had sold an automobile to a
local Oregon resident who was subsequently injured by defective equipment while on
a trip in Washington. The court sustained jurisdiction over the national manufac-
turer. Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 845, 425 P.2d 647 (1967).
" While emphasized in International Shoe, inconvenience to the corporate de-
fendant has become less significant in the modern economic setting of corporations
actively seeking expanded multistate markets. Conversely, there has been increased
emphasis on the plaintiff's inconvenience in suing out-of-state. Courts now seem
more concerned with the relative amount the plaintiff and corporation have at stake.
See discussion of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra note 24. Because the
cost of defending foreign suits is an inevitable expense in our integrated economy,
this expense should be accepted as a cost of doing business and should be spread
among the ultimate national consumers. But the plaintiff's convenience issue too
may have only minimal value when balanced with other factors. As one commentator
observes: after Hanson the "status of.. additional balancing factors of convenience
to the plaintiff and location of witnesses seems to be in considerable doubt." 51 VA.
L. REV., supra note 2, at 727.
The factor of relative convenience to the parties was considered by the Washing-
ton court in Tyee, Nixon, Golden Gate and Callahan. In Tyee, the "probable" incon-
venience to Belyea of litigating in this state mitigated against jurisdiction. 62
Wn. 2d at 117, 381 P.2d at 252. In Nixon, on the other hand, it was found more
convenient for the nonresidents to defend in Washington than for the plaintiffs to
sue in Oregon. 62 Wn. 2d at 997-98, 385 P.2d at 311-12. In Golden Gate, the court
noted "in passing" that Washington was the most convenient forum, 66 Wn. 2d at
472, 403 P.2d at 354; and, in Callahan, the court apparently dismissed the factor in
terms of foreseeability. 72 Wash. Dec. 2d at 829, 435 P.2d at 636. In no case does
the court discuss the merits of this factor in terms of others.
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court noted that the defendant had purposefully consummated a
business transaction in Washington but refused to assume jurisdiction
because, in part, the "transaction represented an isolated business
excursion into this state ... and... involved no systematic or continu-
ing service ... .,37 In contrast, the Griffl ths decision turned solely on
the purposeful act and omitted even a mention of past activity.
The language in Tyee"8 and the court's reliance in that case on the
absence of defendant's past activity suggests that the court used
"doing business" notions in interpreting the then new statutory lan-
guage: "the transaction of any business." "9 Four years later, the
court refined its analysis. In Quigley v. Spano Crane Sales & Serv.,
Inc.40 the court stated that the "standard described in the phrase
'transaction of any business within the state' " was "far broader
and more widely inclusive" than traditionally narrow concepts of
doing business. While prior to the enactment of the long arm statute,
a continuous and regular course of business within the state was
necessary to assert jurisdiction-now, said the court, "a solitary busi-
ness deal" would suffice to meet the statute's requirement as to the
transaction of any business.4 Following Quigley, past activity has
'762 Wn. 2d at 117, 381 P.2d at 252. The Tyee court considered the purposeful
act and past activity factors as matters in different planes of analysis. See note 34,
mtpra.
I See note 20, supra.
3Appellate briefs reveal the likelihood that the court was persuaded by defendant
that "the portions of that statute (WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.28.185 (1959)) germane to
this proceeding raise no issues other than those contained in the general concept of
'doing business!"' Defendant argued ably that Washington decisions (obviously prior
to the long arm statute) showed "that single or isolated transactions do not constitute
doing business in Washington." Turning to decisions of other jurisdictions (espe-
cially Illinois) construing similar statutes, defendant urged that prior activity in
the forum was a prerequisite of "transacting business" just as it was for "doing
business." Brief for Respondent at 16, 17, 25-36, Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel
Products, Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963).
In retrospect, defendant's arguments appear based on a faulty interpretation of the
long arm statute. Looking at the same Illinois decisions as did defendant, Professor
Currie reached the opposite conclusion. Currie, supra note 22, at 563-66. Discussing
the irrelevance of past activity, he concluded:
That the defendant has also conducted other and unrelated activities in the
State may or may not make it more convenient for him to defend here, but the
basic requirement that he make voluntary contact with the State is satisfied.
without such additional contacts.
Id. at 566.
Another source of confusion for the Tyee court might have been a scholarly com-
ment on the Washington long arm statute published shortly after its enactment. In
this brief review of the new law "transaction of business" is explained in terms of
"doing business," leaving the impression that the concepts are identical. Trautman,
Procedure, 1959 Survey of Wash. Law, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 323, 326 (1959).
'70 Wash. Dec. 2d 193, 422 P.2d 512 (1967).
1 Id. at 196, 422 P.2d at 414.
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become a less important factor in the jurisdictional due process analy-
sis of contract disputes."
Despite the growing importance of the purposeful act factor and the
relative decline of convenience and past activity as components in
the due process analysis, it would be precipitous to conclude that one
need only prove a purposeful act to assure jurisdiction in contract
litigation.43 Obviously, where a non-resident knowingly and purpose-
fully participates in a "business deal" in the forum, he will fall within
the purview of the statute as to acts arising from his forum involve-
ment.4 But there are contract situations wherein it is conceivable
that a single, isolated act may fit the "purposeful act" test and still be
insufficient to sustain jurisdiction. 5 In such a case, other due process
"The Quigley court demeaned the importance of past activity and the Grifliths
court apparently ignored it. It appears significant that after Quigley, Griffiths was
the next "transaction of any business" case and followed Quigley by less than seven
months.
'The purposeful act factor is always necessary (see note 33 supra) but the
presence of the purposeful act might not always sustain jurisdiction.
" WASH. REv. CODE § 4.28.185(1) (3) (1959) expressly limits long arm jurisdiction
to suits arising from the transaction. However, there is no reason why personal juris-
diction could not be founded on doing business notions in situations where the
cause of action is unrelated to a non-resident's contacts with the forum. In such
cases, continuous and systematic past activity in the state would be a prerequisite
and the state court has discretion, for reasons of state policy, to entertain or dismiss
the suit. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
In Washington, the doing business statute (WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.080 (1959))
has remained in force despite enactment of the long arm statute. The doing business
statute has been interpreted by a long series of decisions, two as recent as 1963
(four years after passage of the long arm statute). The most notable interpretation
of the statute is International Shoe Co. v. State, 22 Wn. 2d 146, 154 P.2d 801, aff'd,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
In at least two jurisdictions, a doing business clause functions as both a doing
business statute and a long arm statute. Justice Traynor, writing for the California
Supreme Court, argues that the California doing business statute (CAL. CIVIL PRO.
CODE § 411, subd. 2 (West 1954)) can be extended to the modern limits of the due
process clause. Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Ct. City & County San Francisco, 53
Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959). This approach to jurisdictional analy-
sis makes a long arm statute unnecessary. In Traynor's view this result is desirable
for several reasons, one reason being the avoidance of problems of statutory construc-
tion. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657, 662 (1959).
Similarly, New Jersey law (N.J.R.R. 4:4-4(d)) permits out-of-state service of
process subject only to the limits of due process. According to the New Jersey court:
Our rule contains no definitions, limitations or exceptions .... [A]nything any
state can do under the Federal Constitution we can do .... Hence, we do not
need to struggle with the oft difficult problems of statutory construction faced by
courts in states with detailed 'long arm statutes.'
Roland v. Modell's Shopper's World, Inc., 92 N.J. Super. 1, 222 A.2d 110, 113 (App.
Div. 1966). See generally Note, In Personant Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations:
An Interest-Balancing Test, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 33 (1967).
Obviously, accurate judicial analysis, supplemented by legislative amendment
(e.g. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. §302(a) (McKinney Supp. 1967)) eliminates many construc-
tional problems. Cases like Griffiths provide strong rebuttal to arguments that long
arm statutes are clumsy and should be abandoned.
" Consider the hypothetical in which an individual from a southeastern state
writes to a large Washington corporation to make a small purchase. The buyer has
never had any previous contact with either the corporation or this state. After the
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factors would be relevant and the court might resort to a balancing or
weighing of each factor. Thus, the presence or absence of past activity
could be critical in some cases.46 Or, intense governmental interest
in the suit might be the determinative factor 7 Griffiths has not ruled
out all balancing, but has made clear that in most instances where
there is a purposeful act the absence of past activity or other factors
may not preclude jurisdiction.
The Griffiths decision is both a clarification and expansion of long
arm jurisdiction." Tyee and its progeny, using an undifferentiated
balancing approach, have failed to articulate clearly the reasons for
deciding jurisdictional questions. The Griffiths court's implied selec-
merchandise is sent to the buyer he defaults. Though the buyer acted purposefully and
knowingly it might seem contrary to a sense of fairness to assert Washington juris-
diction over the individual. See discussion of relative convenience, mtpra note 36.
4"A recent decision in which the court found the immediate contacts with the
forum insufficient for jurisdiction, and refused to consider past activity as a cure for
the insufficiency is criticised in 52 MINN. L. REv. 723 (1968).
" In light of McGee, the governmental interest factor is clearly one of significant
weight. See discussion of McGee, supra note 24. The Washington court first recog-
nized the governmental interest factor in Nixon. The court did not, however, assess
its relative significance. 62 Wn. 2d at 998, 385 P.2d at 311. The factor was again
mentioned without discussion of its importance in Callahan. 72 Wash. Dec. 2d at
828, 435 P.2d at 636. See discussion of governmental interest factor in Callahan,
supra note 30.
Governmental interest is a factor nearly as determinative as the purposeful act.
However, since the purposefulness factor is present in most cases and governmental
interest seems limited to unusual cases involving a "special regulatory" interest,
the purposeful act will remain more important in jurisdictional analysis. Professor
Currie argues that governmental interest should not be restricted to "special regulatory"
matters. Currie, supra note 22, at 540-41,549-50. Herein, lies the future of the factor.
48An argument can be posed that Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72
Wash. Dec. 2d 814, 435 P.2d 626 (1967), suggests a course for the future that may
restrict jurisdiction. In Callahan, the court injects into the decision a long quota-
tion from Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Ct. City & County San Francisco, 53
Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959). In this statement Justice Traynor lists
six factors relevant to jurisdictional analysis. It is Traynor's position that these
factors also constitute forum non conveniens tests. Traynor, supra note 44, at 663-64.
The Washington Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens is not a part of the law of this state. Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard Corp.,
54 Wn. 2d 124, 338 P.2d 747 (1959). Once a Washington court has assumed juris-
diction it cannot then dismiss on the jurisdictional ground that a more appropriate
forum is available. See Trautman, Forum Non Conveniens In Washington--A Dead
Issue?, 35 WAsH. L. REv. 88 (1960).
If the Callahan court was approving Traynor's analysis of the closing gap between
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens, the court could merge the two doctrines, call
them both jurisdictional analysis, and sub silentio reverse its holding in Lansverk. It
would then be possible for the court to reject jurisdiction at the outset of a case
for reasons more relevant to forum non conveniens. [Quaere whether Washington has
already reached this result? Cf. Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d
845, 425 P.2d 647 (1967) (dissent).] Obviously, jurisdiction would be restricted in the
process. It would seem more appropriate to overrule Lansverk directly and adopt a
two step analysis even though some factors in the analysis are similar. As the
United States Supreme Court suggested in Hanson, the interests underlying a
choice-of-law ruling may differ from those justifying assertion of jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant. 357 U.S. at 253.
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tive approach may preview a new clarity in jurisdictional analysis. In
future opinions the court should give explicit recognition to the relative
values of various due process factors. Such action would assure
greater predictability and promote orderly legal development.
Even without an explicit differentiation among due process factors,
Griffiths' sole reliance on the purposeful act may produce a significant
expansion of jurisdiction. The court may be saying that it need only
find some intentional course of conduct upon which an inference of
submission to jurisdiction may be rationally based.49 The court's
willingness to find such conduct in our integrated economy suggests a
more certain remedy for forum businessmen in their contract disputes
with foreign corporations.5"
A CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA FOR
LOITERING STATUTES?
Defendant was stopped on a public sidewalk by a police officer
and asked to identify himself and account for his presence. He re-
fused to comply with this request, and was arrested and charged with
disorderly conduct.' On appeal to the California District Court of
Appeals, the lower court's dismissal was reversed. Held: One who
loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without
apparent reason or business has no constitutional right to remain
silent when the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate
to a peace officer as a reasonable man that the public safety demands
49The Washington court expressed this notion while commenting on Gray v.
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Oliver
v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 845, 858, 425 P.2d 647, 655 (1967).
' Critics have suggested that exposure of businessmen to foreign suits will dis-
courage casual interstate commerce. See Fourth N.W. Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus.,
Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732, 736 (1961); Conn. v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d
250, 342 P.2d 871, 874 (1959); Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-
Residents in Our Federal System, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196, 204-06 (1957). A more
likely inhibiting factor would be the uncertainty engendered by "essays in juris-
dictional analysis." Businessmen who can anticipate the legal consequences of for-
eign transactions are able to seek appropriate protection.
'The relevant portion of CAL. PEN. CODE §647(e) (West Supp. 1967) reads as
follows:
Every person who commits any of the following acts shall be guilty of disorderly
conduct, a misdemeanor:
(e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without ap-
parent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for
his presence when requested by any peace officer so to do, if the surrounding cir-
cumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety
demands such identification.
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